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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**

Trust Created to'Faciiitate Secured
Financing Held ineligible for
Bankruptcy Relief
In a divided decision that should
be of interest to those involved in
the structuring of secured financing
transactions, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held ihat a
trust created in connection with the
sale and leaseback of a portion of
the fleet of Eastern Air Lines is not
a “ business trust’’ and, therefore,
is not eligible for bankruptcy relief. '
Eastern Air Lines sought to raise
$500 million in financing using a
portion of its aircraft fleet as collat
eral. The mechanism used for the
financing transaction, involved the
creation of a trust pursuant to the
“ Secured Equipment Indenture and
Lease Agreement Between First Fi
delity Bank, Indenture Trustee and
Eastern Air Lines, Inc.’’ The trust
♦ Special Counsel to the law firm of
Kaye, Scholer, Fiennan, Hays & Handler,
New York, N .Y.; member of the National
Bankruptcy Conference.
♦* Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra Uni
versity School of Law, Hempstead, N .Y.;
Counsel to the firm of Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson, New York, N.Y.;
member of the National Bankruptcy Confer
ence.
' In re Secured Equip. Trust of Eastern
Air Lines, Inc. (Shawmut Bank Conn., et
al. V. First Fidelity Bank, et al.), 38 F.3d
86 (1994).

sold to investors $500 million in
“ trust certificates,’’ used the pro
ceeds of the sale of the certificates
to purchase a portion of Eastern’s
fleet, and leased the fleet back to
Eastern in exchange for Eastern’s
agreement to maké rental payments
equal to the amount of principal,
premium, and interest on the certifi
cates. It was undisputed that the sale
and leaseback transaction between
Eastern and the trust was a secured
financing transaction, rather than a
true sale and lease.
The trust certificates were sold in
three series; a first-priority $2(X)
million series due in 1993, a secondpriority $200 million series due in
1996, ând a third-priority $100 mil
lion series due in 2001. Although
the trust had one trustee, called the
“ Collateral Trustee,’’ who man
aged the affairs of the trust, each
series of certificates was represent
ed by its own “ Series Trustee.’’
The Collateral Trustee had the re
sponsibility of collecting the lease
payments from Eastern Air Lines
and distributing them to certificateholders in accordance with the
priorities set forth in the indenture.
Any rental payments in excess of
the amounts due under the indenture
would have to be returned to East
ern. Upon payment in full by East
ern, title to the collateral would be
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reconveyed to Eastern and the trust
would be dissolved. The indenture
gave the Collateral Trustee the pow
er, upon a default by Eastern, to
take possession of the collateral and
to hold, sell, keep, or lease its com
ponents in order to enforce the in
denture.
After Eastern filed a chapter 11
petition in 1989, it stopped making
rental payments to the trust. Each
of the three Series Trustees filed
proofs of claim in Eastern’s bank
ruptcy case for the principal, premi
ums, interest, fees, and expenses
owed to the holders of the certifi
cates. In 1991, the Collateral Trust
ee and Eastern’s chapter 11 trustee
entered into a stipulation that result
ed in certain aircraft being returned
by Eastern to the trust and the turn
over to the trust of over $230 million
in proceeds from Eastern’s sale and
lease of collateral.
Pursuant to its powers under the
indenture, after Eastern’s default,
the Collateral Trustee began to ac
tively manage, maintain, market,
lease, and sell the equipment en
trusted to it. In connection with
these functions, the Collateral
Trustee hired lawyers, accountants,
and an aviation consultant to assist
in the process of liquidating the col
lateral, a process that was estimated
to take several years to complete.
Involuntary Petition Filed
In 1991, three holders of trust
certificates—which
certificates
equaled $54.2 million in aggregate
principal amount—filed an involun
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tary chapter 11 petition against the
trust in the District of New Jesey.
The Resolution Trust Corporation,
which held $35 million in certifi
cates, subsequently joined in the pe
tition. The Collateral Trustee
moved to dismiss the case or, alter
natively, to have it transferred to
the Southern District of New York.
The case was transferred to the
Southern District, where the East
ern Air Lines bankruptcy case was
pending, and the bankruptcy court
then granted the motion to dismiss
the case. The bankruptcy court held,
and the district court affirmed, that
the tnist was not a “ business trust’’
and, therefore, was not eligible for
relief under the Bankruptcy Code.
The Bankruptcy Code makes an
important distinction between
“ business trusts” and other types
of trusts. Under the Code, only a
‘‘person’’ is eligible for bankruptcy
relief. Section 109(a) provides that
only a “person that resides or has a
domicile, a place of business, or
property in the United States, or a
municipality, may be a debtor under
this title.” In addition. Section
303(a) provides that only a “ per
son” may be the subject of an invol
untary petition. The term “ person”
is defined in Section 101 of the Code
to include an “ individual, partner
ship, and corporation. . . .’’ Al
though one might conclude from
these sections alone that a trust is
not eligible for bankruptcy relief, it
would be a mistake to stop examin
ing the definitions in the Code. The
term “ corporation” is defined in
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Section 101 to include a “ business
trust.’’ Unfortunately, the Code
does not include a definition of
“ business trust.”
The sole issue presented to the
Second Circuit was whether, the
trust is a ‘‘business trust’’ within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.
“ Notably, we have never before
had to expressly address the defini
tion of ‘business trust’ under the
Bankruptcy Code. Furthermore, al
though many other courts have been
called on to make this type of deter
mination, none have been presented
with a trust that was created in order
to secure the payment of certificates
issued in connection with a secured
financing. As such, we are faced
with an issue of first impression for
this and any appellate court. ’
The court of appeals looked to the
methodology used by other courts
faced with die question of whether
a certain trust is a ‘‘business trust.
Since a business trust is included in
the definition of “ corporation,” it
is not surprising that courts have
looked to see whether the trust in
question had the attributes of a cor
poration. “ Clearly, most courts
agree that a basic distinction be
tween a business trust and other
trusts is that business trusts are cre
ated for the purpose of carrying on
some kind of business, whereas the
purpose of a non-business trust is
to protect and preserve the res.” ^
However, the Second Circuit also
noted that, while a trust must engage

in business-like activities to be a
business trust, “ such activity, with
out more, does not necessarily dem
onstrate that a trust is a business
trust. ’ Except for these few gener
al guidelines, the decisions are
hopelessly divided and “ each deci
sion is based on a very fact specific
analysis of the trust at issue. ’’’
The petitioning creditors, who
had the burden of establishing that
the trust was eligible for bankruptcy
relief, argued to the bankruptcy
court that the trust’s activities dem
onstrate that it is a business trust. In
particular, they argued that, since
Eastern filed its bankruptcy peti
tion, the Collateral Trustee has car
ried on the business of leasing and
selling the equipment, including
hiring accountants, attorneys, and
marketing personnel to assist in
those endeavors. The bankruptcy
court did not find these arguments
persuasive, and held that the trust
in this case is not a business trust
because it was established only to
‘‘secure the payment of the Secured
Equipment Certificates,’’® rather
than to generate a profit or to liqui
date the final affairs of a company
originally established to generate a
profit.
Absence of Profit-Generating
Purpose
On appeal to the Second Circuit,
which reviewed the lower courts’
definition of “ business trust” de
“ W.

5/d.

2 38F .3 d at8 8 -8 9 .
^ 3 8 F .3 d at8 9 .

‘ /d.
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novo, the petitioning creditors ar
gued that the bankruptcy court was
wrong in requiring as a condition to
being a business trust that the trust
have a profit-generating purpose.
They cited several decisions in
which courts have found a trust to
be a business trust despite the ab
sence of a profit motive, including
one decision in which a self-funded
employee benefit plan trust that pro
vided and maintained health bene
fits for employees of member stores
was held to be a business trust even
though it did not operate to generate
profits.’ Cases that were factually
similar, but where the courts have
concluded that such trusts were not
business trusts, were cited by the
Collateral Trustee.** The Second
Circuit did not find it necessary to
resolve this split of authority, be
cause it did not read the bankruptcy
court’s decision as foreclosing the
possibility that trusts not established
to create a profit may nonetheless
be business trusts. “ We interpret
the [bankruptcy] court’s reference
to trusts that seek profits or carry
on the final affairs of a company as
merely examples of what the court
also refers to as trusts that ‘transact
’ In re Affiliated Food Stores, Ine. Group
Benefit Trust, 134 B.R. 215 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1991).
* The Collateral Trustee eited In re Con
sol. Welfare Fund "ER ISA ” Litig., 798 F.
Supp. 125(S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Westches
ter County Civil Serv. Employees Assoc.,
Inc. Benefit Fund, 111 B.R. 451 (Bankr.
S.D .N.Y . 1990); and In re Cahill Assocs.
Pension Plan, 15 B.R. 639 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1981).
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business for the benefit of in
vestors.’ ’”
Although it stopped short of hold
ing that a profit-generating purpose
is a necessary element of a business
trust, the Second Circuit empha
sized that many courts have found
the presence or absence of a profit
motive influential in their determi
nation as to whether a trust is eligi
ble for bankruptcy relief. “ As most
corporations are established to gen
erate a profit, we too find this factor
relevant to our determination of
whether the Trust is a business trust.
We do not, however, foreclose the
possibility that a Trust that was not
specifically established to generate
a profit may still be considered a
business trust.’”“
Applying these legal principles to
the case at hand, the Second Circuit
concluded that the trust was not es
tablished to generate a profit.
“ Assuming arguendo that the inter
est the certificateholders are entitled
to constitútes profit . . . the Trust
was not established to generate such
interest. Rather, it was established
merely to secure the repayment of the
certificateholders’ loans to Eastern.
As such, its purpose was to preserve
the interest that the certificateholders
had already been guaranteed, not to
generate it. Notably, any payments
in excess of amounts due under the
Indenture were to be returned to
Eastern.’’"

The Second Circuit also conclud
ed that, aside from the absence of
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a profit motive, the trust was not
created to “ transact business” as
that term is commonly construed.
The trust was not created to run a
business, but was established only
to serve as a vehicle to facilitate
secured financing. Creation of the
trust and placing title to the collater
al pool in one entity “ enabled nu
merous lenders to receive the bene
fit of a security interest without the
need for multiple security agree
ments and filings, which would
drastically increase transaction
costs.
Any business activities
that the trust is engaged in were
incidental to the trust’s sole respon
sibility of protecting the certificateholder’s security interest.
Moreover, the court of appeals
commented that its inquiry was
based on the totality of the circum
stances and the trust documents, not
solely on whether the trust engages
in a business.
The Second Circuit also found
unpersuasive the argument that, by
denying the petitioning creditors re
lief under the Bankruptcy Code, the
court would be depriving them of
any forum to adjudicate their
claims. First, the court questioned
whether the availability of another
forum should be given any weight
in a determination of whether a trust
is a business trust. Second, the peti
tioners are not left entirely widiout
a forum. “ Although petitioners may
have no forum in which to seek
redress from the Trust for a decline
in the value of the Collateral Pool,

because the petitioner.s are actually
secured creditors of Eastern, their
deficiency claims can. be dealt with
in Eastern’s bankruptcy.” '^ The
court noted that each Series Trustee
had filed in the Eastern case a proof
of claim on behalf of the certificateholders it represents. The peti
tioners,also could resort to state or
federal court to assert any claims
regarding the management of, or
distributions made by, the trust.
On theJjasis of this reasoning, the
Second Circuit held, by a 2-1 vote,
that the trust was not a business trust
and, therefore, was not eligible for
relief under the Bankruptcy Code.
The Dissent
In a dissenting opinion. Judge
Kearse argued that the trust was a
business trust and that the case
should npt have been dismissed.
Judge Kearse emphasized that the
certificateholders expected to earn
a profitable return on their invest
ments and that the Collateral Trust
ee had the power to, and actively
did, manage, lease, and sell the
assets of the trust. As of January
1991, the Collateral Trustee had
taken possession of, engaged in a
marketing program for, and ar
ranged for the maintenance, repair,
storage, and insurance of, 67 com
mercial jet aircraft and 165 engines.
It was still managing a fleet of 47
aircraft two years later. “ In my
view, the Trustee was operating a
business, and the Trust would be a
business trust under New York law.
Id. at 91.

3 8 F .3 d at9 0 .
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which defines such an entity as ‘any stitutions that agreed to make collat
association operating a business un eralized loans to Eastern agreed to
der a written instrument or declara have the money transferred and the
tion of trust, the beneficial interest aircraft collateral held, and it is
under which is divided into shares plain from the indenture documents
represented by certificates. ’ ”
that neither the loans nor the interest
The dissenting opinion also re payable to the certificateholders ex
ferred to legislative history of the isted independent of the Trust. The
Bankruptcy Code for guidance. The Trust was established in order to
former Bankruptcy Act defined enter into the purchase-and“ corporation” to include “ any leaseback transactions that would
business conducted by a trustee or generate the rental income that cre
trustees wherein beneficial interest ated
the
certificateholders’
or ownership is evidenced by certif profits.” ’’
icate or other written instrument. ’’
The dissent also emphasized that
When the Bankruptcy Code was en the trust was “ no eleemosynary en
acted in 1978, this language was tity,” '* even though excess profits
replaced with “ business trust” and generated by the sale-leaseback
the House and Senate Judiciary would be payable to Eastern. Judge
Committee Reports on the Code in Kearse criticized the majority for
dicated that “ [t]he definition of putting too much weight on the fact
‘corporation’ . . . is similar to the that the return for investors was
definition in current law, section contractually limited. “ I fail to see
1(8).’
Judge Kearse concluded why the agreed profit limitation
from this legislative history that the should remove the Trust from the
term “ business trust” was intended Code definition of corporation. ’’”
to include the type of trust described
Ramifications of the Court’s
in the definition of “ corporation”
Decision for Asset Securitization
in the former Act, and that the trust
in this case fits that definition.
Transactions
Judge Kearse also disagreed with
In recent years, we have seen the
the' majority’s view that the trust growth of the use of asset-backed
was created merely for the preserva securities as a vehicle to raise cash
tion of assets. “ The Trust was a for companies that have substantial
vehicle through which financial in- receivables or other income-gener
ating assets. Although transactions
38F .3dat92. Judge Kearse cited N.Y.
involving asset-backed securities
General Associations Law § 2.2. as the ap
plicable authority under New York law.
are not all the same and may have
11 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1976), repealed by
different
features, typically, receivthe Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
“ 38 F.3d at 92. The court cited S. Rep.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1978);
H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
309(1978).
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ables or other income producing
assets are sold to a newly created
special-purpose entity that issues
notes or other securities to raise the
cash needed to buy the assets. The
cash flow from the assets is used to
pay the notes or other debt securi
ties. The securities issued by the
special-purpose entity often receive
a higher credit rating than would
similar securities issued by the op
erating company, because the debt
securities are evaluated on the basis
of the particular asset pool, rather
than on the creditworthiness of the
operating company. These transac
tions are usually structured as a
“ true sale” of assets to the specialpurpose entity without recourse to
the selling company, rather than as
a secured loan to the company, to
minimize the risk that the bankmptcy of the company will interrupt and
otherwise affect the collection of
receivables and cash flow to the
investors. Finally, lawyers who
structure these transactions attempt
to make the special-purpose entity
as ‘‘bankruptcy remote’’ as possible
so as to reduce the likelihood that
the entity will itself be the subject
of a bankruptcy petition. This is
often attempted using such strate
gies as requiring independent direc
tors who must consent to any bank
ruptcy petition, placing restrictions
on the debt that the entity may incur,
and taking certain steps to minimize
the risk of substantive consolidation
of the special purpose entity and the
company.
One can only speculate as to
whether the Second Circuit’s deci

sion that the secured equipment trust
in the Eastern Air Lines matter is
ineligible for bankruptcy relief will
tempt lawyers to use trusts instead
of corporations as the special-pur
pose entity in asset-backed securiti
zation financing. A careful reading
of the court’s opinion reveals sever
al indications that the holding may
not apply to typical asset-securitiza
tion financing. First, the court em
phasized that a determination of
whether a trust is a business trust
for bankruptcy eligibility purposes
depends on the particular facts of the
case. “ Ultimately, each decision is
based on a very fact specific analysis
of the trust at issue.” “ Second, in
determining that the trust was not
created to generate a profit, the
court emphasized that the sole pur
pose of the trust was to preserve the
interest payments that the certificateholders had already been guar
anteed: “ Notably, any payments in
excess of amounts due under the
Indenture were to be returned to
Eastern.
In contrast, the transfer
of assets to a special-purpose entity
in an asset-securitization financing
transaction is often designed to be
construed as a “ true sale” without
leaving the operating company with
a financial interest in the cash flow
from the transferred assets. Third,
the court pointed out—apparently
because it found it relevant—that it
was undisputed that the saleleaseback transaction in that case
was merely a secured loan to East-
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ern. Again, typical asset-securitiza
tion transactions are structured as
true sales to minimize the risk of
being characterized as secured loans
to the operating company.
These warnings, and the inherent
risk in relying on a 2-1 decision of
the only circuit court to face the
issue, should leave lawyers in sub
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stantial doubt as to whether a trust
used as a special-purpose entity in a
typical asset-securitization financ
ing transaction will be ineligible for
bankruptcy relief. In any event,
lawyers should carefully consider
the features of the particular trans
action before speculating as to
whether any trust is a “ business
trust” under the Bankruptcy Code.
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